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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

Win Lord

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oun October 8, 1976

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To:

The Secretary

Through:

P - Mr. Habib W. Jan

From:

EA - Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. Awdre

S/P - Winston Lord WL

## Your Meeting with PRC Foreign Minister Chiao

This supplements our memorandum of October 4 on your meeting with Chiao, covering several events since that time: Chiao's UN speech, the Ford-Carter foreign policy debate, the nuclear test fall-out issue, approval of the CODEL Curtis visit, and an exchange visit imbroglio. It also mentions USLO office space, which Chiao conceivably might raise, and the CDC case.

## Chiao's UN Speech

Chiao's October 5 General Debate statement said nothing specific about Sino-US bilateral relations, although he did confirm Mao's "revolutionary foreign policy line" (which includes the opening to the US) and he did repeat the litany that China is determined to liberate Taiwan.

Generally, Chiao reserved his major blasts for the Soviets, but he did come down rather hard on us as a superpower, and he specifically attacked detente, the US threat to veto Vietnam's UN membership and our stance on world economic "interdependence." He criticized superpower "rivalry" in Africa, and implicitly attacked your efforts in South Africa by supporting the "armed struggle" of the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. While he said the usual about US troops in South Korea and about the UN Command, he eschewed any comment upon your proposal for a conference to resolve Korean issues. The speech gives us no cause for satisfaction but it preserves the existing Chinese perception of the USSR as the worse

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of the two superpowers and was roughly consistent with past Chiao performances at the UNGA, excepting, of course, for the panegyrics about Chairman Mao.

In referring to Chiao's speech, you may wish to comment that he let off some cannon shots at the Soviets. You might complain that, on the one hand, the Chinese accuse us of appeasement and, on the other, they attack us when we are actually working against the Soviets.

#### Presidential Debate

Statements about normalization by each candidate in Wcdnesday's debate exacerbate problems already facing you at this meeting. Chiao may well refer to the President's remarks, taking issue specifically with the President's statement that a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question was "agreed" in the Shanghai Communique. He might also refer to the President's statement that "for the next four years" we will continue to move for normalization of relations, thus implying that we do not expect early completion of the process.

If Chiao mentions the President's assertion that peaceful liberation was "agreed" in the Shanghai Communique, you could respond that the important points were the President's reaffirmation of the policy of normalizing relations and his confirmation that our relations would continue to be based on the Shanghai Communique.

If Chiao complains about the President's reference to our "obligation" to the people of Taiwan, you could take the line that you are surprised that Chiao would find this to be a new or startling idea and could go on to drive home the point that the President was only reflecting the serious U.S. public concern with which any American President must deal. You could tell Chiao also that the Chinese should be the last ones to complain about our language in an unrehearsed debate, given their (carefully prepared) rhetoric in international forums and the press. (A transcript of the China policy portion of the debate is at page 5.)

## Chinese Nuclear Fallout

You undertook, in your Wednesday press guidance, to "make our position clear once again" to the PRC on the

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question of atmospheric testing. We suggest that you take the occasion of this meeting to do so, since we are getting press queries about whether we have said anything to the Chinese. If you do raise it with Chiao, we will want to tell the press afterwards, if asked, that you have done so.

NO

### CODEL Curtis

PRCLO informed the White House this week that Peking has agreed to our proposal that the earthquake-deferred visit of CODEL Curtis (six Senators and wives) take place early next month. You might volunteer to Chiao that you are pleased that this visit will take place since such Congressional trips, if they are handled correctly, can be useful in building support in Congress for our policy of normalizing relations.

## USLO Office Space

We do not expect Chiao to mention the USLO office space problem and do not recommend that you raise it. However, because Ambassador Gates did discuss it with Chiao last summer and because the PRC recently offered us two additional apartments for office space (which we accepted), Chiao may say something about it to you or Gates. If he does, you should indicate your awareness of the Chinese decision and express appreciation; but you should note that we still hope for a more satisfactory solution to our space problem.

# PRC Volleyball Imbroglio

A scheduling conflict in which Chinese mens' and womens' volleyball teams will be performing in Pasadena, Texas, on October 9, the same night that an ROC chamber music orchestra is performing at Rice University in nearby Houston, could result in cancellation of the PRC volleyball show there. (The Chinese teams played matches in Fairfax, Virginia, Thursday night.) As of Thursday afternoon, the problem, which is being discussed between the Chinese and the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations, had not been sharply focused and the Chinese had not made a direct complaint. If they do so before your meeting, we will inform you.

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CDC Computer

As you know, a White House decision on the computer sale has been kept in abeyance. We don't think you will want to raise the issue at this meeting even though it was a talking point in our October 4 memorandum.

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